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DOES PARTY IDEOLOGY MATTER?
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Figure 1. Frequency Distribution of Key Divisions
Did these historic domestic-policy divisions evoke conflict or consensus from House legislators? As a first cut at this data set, consensual divisions-defined as those in which at least 85 percent of those voting were eidier in favor or againstare distinguished from conflictual divisions.
12 By this measure, 68 percent of all chamber divisions turned out to be at least minimally conflictual (54 consensual, 121 conflictual).
Many legislatures operate with a high degree of crosspartisan agreementwhen bills come up for a vote on final passage. (It is the low degree of party unity, not the relatively high degree of cross-party unity, that most distinguishes the American Congress from legislatures around the world.
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) Nonetheless, there seems to have been significant variation over time, and this may tell us something about the importance or nonimportance of party ideology as a factor in House legislative activity (see Fig. 2 ).
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Conflictual division=where die majority garners<85% of the vote
Figure 2. Conflict and Consensus in Key House Divisions
Conflict seems to have increased in die decades leading up to die Civil War, reaching historical highs during die Reconstruction era. Indeed, all bills and resolutions identified as key from 1870 to 1889 stimulated conflictual voting behavior in die House. The precipitous drop in conflict registered at the turn of the century is somewhat higher than one might expect; on ^\z other hand, work on die Progressive Era and the Twenties depicts two parties with strong regional splits.
14 From this angle, it is no surprise to see conflict dropping to its lowest level in the 150-year period under consideration. A brief look at specific bills and resolutions (see Appendix) confirms that a good portion of die legislation usually referred to as typical of Progressive Era reform-for example the Sherman Antitrust Act, die Pure Food and Drug Act, die Hepburn bill, die 16th amendment to die Constitution, the Sheppard-Towner bill-was passed by bipartisan majorities in the House. During the New Deal era (broadly considered, from Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0898030600003390 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Texas Libraries, on 01 Mar 2019 at 17:23:08, subject to the 404 DOES PARTY IDEOLOGY MATTER? 1930 MATTER? to 1949 , voting returns to a more conflictual (and usually, as we shall see, partisan) basis-including roughly three-quarters of all bills and resolutions. During the postwar period, conflict declines once again, leaving the twentieth century looking a good deal more consensual than the nineteenth.
Of course, the same data may be aggregated in different ways. Instead of grouping bills and resolutions into two-decade blocks, one might count each bill/resolution separately in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries according to whether it culminated in a conflictual or consensual vote. This cut at the evidence reveals an equally stark picture of increasing consensualism. More than 90 percent of all House divisions under consideration were conflictual in the nineteenth century (38 out of a total of 42), while about 61 percent were conflictual in the twentieth century (79 out of a total of 129).
1S Patterns A m o n g Conflictual Divisions
What patterns can be discovered among that category of divisions-more than two-thirds of the total-deemed conflictual 7 . I begin with the assumption that in order to discover, and effectively explain, the behavior of legislators across a vast range of bills and resolutions we must evaluate these measures along more than one dimension of policy space. 16 Here, measures are divided into four issue-types: (1) Capitalism (pro-business or anti-labor policies-e.g., anti-inflationary monetary policies, opposition to the minimum wage), (2) Government (policies to redistribute wealth or increase the reach and authority of the federal governmente.g., increases in taxes, expenditures, infrastructure, social policies, environmental policies, agricultural policies, or economic policies), (3) Minority (policies designed to benefit women and minorities), and (4) Morality (policies designed to reinforce moral order-e.g., prohibition, abortion).
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How parsimoniously can party positions be accounted for across these four issue-areas? My hypotheses, derived from standard historical work as well as from my own investigations, 18 are listed in Table 1 . In order to measure the accuracy of these hypotheses, each House division is scored according to die number of member decisions correcdy explained. For example, in die first measure listed in die Appendix-S82 (Senate Bill 82)-die issue-type is Government and die bill is judged to have been "Pro" government, since it provided authority for die president to use force in order to enforce revenue (57/96) : 1833 -1896 Pro: 1833 -1920 Pro: 1897 -1992 Con: 1921 -1992 
Con
73%
MINORITY 86% (32/37) Con: 1833 -1948 Pro: 1833 -1964 Pro: 1949 -1992 Con: 1965 -1992 begin with the recognition that all but one of these bills and resolutions pertained specifically to the rights of African Americans. Democrats were vehemently opposed to civil rights measures through 1948, and generally were supportive thereafter. Whig-Republicans were positively inclined towards such measures through about 1964, after which they tended to equivocate. Few issues, it would appear, define die parties so clearly as tiiose concerning minorities. Several caveats are in order, however, before resting upon this conclusion. First, it will be noticed diat Minority divisions comprise a small number of die total divisions under investigation (37/171). Second, most of die divisions classified as Minority-all but twelve, to be exact-occurred in die decades surrounding die Civil War. After die 1870s, Minority issues were much less likely to be conflictual (only half of diem are so classified), and even among diose diat are conflictual our categories explain an average of only 65 percent of the votes (radier than die 80 percent discovered for the entire 1833-92 period). In short, it seems judicious to conclude tiiat Minority issues were prominent, conflictual, and predictable in only one period of American history.
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Votes on Capitalism issues are less conflictual (69 percent) tiian Morality issues overall, but only slighdy less predictable (77 percent). Here too, we must qualify die conclusions presented by diis statistical portrait. Capitalism issues were apparendy of little relevance to antebellum congressional politics. Only one division in our data base appears before die Civil War. It is important to remember diat during the Jacksonian era regulatory laws were usually die prerogative of state and local government, not die federal government. The U.S. economy, in any case, was predominandy agricultural dirough die end of die Civil War.
Yet, from die 1860s to die end of die twentiedi century, die parties' positions on diis very prominent set of issues were remarkably steadfast. On measure after measure, Whig-Republicans defended policies designed to benefit business and attacked policies designed to aid labor unions. Generally, diey supported anti-inflationary monetary policies ("sound money"), and opposed regulatory measures-unless, of course, such regulation came in response to the demands of a particular industry. Generally, Democrats took a dimmer view of pro-business measures and defended labor union legislation.
To be sure, die parties changed dieir economic philosophies-and die attendant policies-a good deal over the course of two centuries. Pre-1920s Whig-Republican views might be summarized as neo-mercantilist and post1920s policies as "laissez-faire" (i.e., as little government interference in die market as possible). Yet, in bodi periods party leaders saw diemselves as advancing die interests of business and paving the way for economic pros-408 DOES PARTY IDEOLOGY MATTER? perity. The Democrats underwent a mirror-image development-from laissezfaire to faire-beginning with the ascension of William Jennings Bryan in the 1890s. Yet, in both periods they were more reticent about the beneficial effects of industrial growth, and more inclined to point out die dangers of consolidation, of "monopoly," of unemployment, and all die attendant ills of capitalist development than dieir Whig-Republican opponents. Thus, if economic policies changed, the purposes of diose policies-vis-a-vis the major economic groups, business and labor-remained fairly constant over diis long stretch of time.
On Government issues only 59 percent of divisions were conflictual. But of tliose divisions-by far the largest issue-category-nearly diree out of four could be correctly explained widi die proposed schema. With one positional transformation in each party's history, partisan behavior was strikingly consistent. Democrats generally opposed statist and/or redistributive measures through the 1890s, and supported such ventures diereafter. Whig-Republicans flip-flopped in die reverse order, widi die key period of transformation occurring several decades later (in die 1920s).
Arguably, die two parties' changed views of government constituted die single most important ideological transformation in American history, even diough diis change was staggered across several decades (from die 1890s to die 1920s). No odier single issue-category has so dominated American public policy debate. Indeed, Government measures constitute well over half of the total divisions examined in diis analysis (96 of 171). If die force and predictability of this issue have been missed in many accounts of American politics (which have tended to privilege issues of a "cultural" nature), it is perhaps because die parties' changed views of government have been poorly understood. 21 On Morality policies (prohibition, abortion, drugs, and so fordi), 89 percent of the divisions were conflictual-die highest rate of conflict in any issue-area-yet only 59 percent of member votes went in die anticipated direction. Widi conflict high and predictability rates low, Morality issues may be considered to be about as amenable to party ideology as die other diree issue-areas. In any case, member votes usually conformed to our hypodieses: Whig-Republicans pushed morality, while Democrats advocated liberty.
22
Were bodi parties equally "ideological"? Democratic legislators conformed to our guesses at a somewhat higher rate than Whig-Republicans across all issue-areas. However, die difference-76 percent versus 72 percent-is slight, and does not suggest any obvious explanation.
Has diere been significant variation over time? The combined performance of both parties across all issue-areas is graphed in Figure 3 The most significant figure, in any case, is the aggregate result. When both parties and all issue-categories are combined, three-quarters (75 percent) of the votes cast by House members on conflictual measures from 1833 to 1992 can be correctly explained by reference to the general hypotheses depicted in 
Discussion
This study has investigated the extent to which voting behavior on key domestic-policy issues in the House of Representatives has been "ideological" over the 1833-1992 period. 1 have shown that divisions on 68 percent of historic bills and resolutions that came before Congress were at least minimally conflictual. On diese measures, individual member behavior could be explained with a simple four-part typology of issues and party-positions three times out of four.
One could stop here. However, to make tbese claims is to set forth a set of empirical facts with very little dieoretical support. Party ideology seems to matter, but parties (as organizations) evidendy do not. Most work on die American parties-at least during the twentieth century-emphasizes the weakness and fragmentation of these institutions. No analog to die hierarchically structured, well-disciplined European party has yet been discovered on American shores. Indeed, one of die principal reasons diat ideology has not been taken seriously in die study of Congress, and in the field of American politics more generally, is that those ideologies do not seem to have at their disposal vehicles sturdy enough to take them where they wish to go. No quantity of empirical studies is likely to overturn this view of things unless a plausible explanation can be offered for why ideology might matter in the fragmented context of American politics. Here, as elsewhere, dieory is necessary before evidence can become fully persuasive. The remainder of this article is therefore devoted to rethinking the question of how, and why, party ideology might have an effect on die American policymaking process.
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Most of the following arguments pertain to politics and policymaking in the latter twentieth century. As organizational entities, nineteenth-century parties were considerably stronger-and policymaking more party-centereddian is currently die case. We do not need to strain for an explanation for why ideology mattered in the "party period" of American history. The postwar era, however, presents a formidable challenge.
Let us begin widi die observation that parties are weak in the American legislature. In Britain, the perennial exemplar of party government, an "in" party governs, and an "out" party opposes. After die franchise was extended and cabinet government established, parties in die House of Commons developed extraordinarily high levels of voting cohesion. In the postwar pe-4 1 1 riod, an average of 89 percent of all (whipped) divisions in the Commons saw 100 percent cohesion in party voting. In die remaining divisions, dissent was likely to concern only a few wayward MPs. Consequendy, an average of 93 percent of all bills introduced by die governing party were enacted. 2 * Things were quite odierwisewidiin die Congress. Party cohesion, akhough slighdy higher in recent years, remains lower tiian virtually anywhere in die democratic world. Committees, although more responsive to party caucuses today dian in die past, are still highly independent of party leadership. Since committees control die flow of legislation to die floor, diis is a fact of no small importance. In die Senate, a wide array of tactics may be used by recalcitrant members to stave off or alter unwanted legislation. In bodi houses, members are diought to respond primarily to local, radier dian national, demands. In sum, die U.S. Congress would seem to be one of die most fragmented legislatures in die Anglo-American world.
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Yet appearances can be deceiving. Apparendy erratic voting patterns widiin die U.S. Congress probably exaggerate the disarray widiin die party caucuses, just as cohesive voting patterns widiin parliamentary systems exaggerate die unity of diese parties. Cox and McCubbins argue diat if one counts only those divisions on which each party's leadership takes a clear standexempting, diat is, "free" divisions in die Congress, just as such divisions are ignored in calculating party-cohesion scores for European parliaments-party cohesion in die House of Representatives reaches more respectable levels. 26 A more important objection to the standard view of Congress concerns what happens off die floor. In die Unites States, as abroad, most of die important decisions are made long before a bill reaches a floor vote. It is at die exploratory stages-while in committee or before a commission-diat legislation is hammered into shape or discarded. Do parties play an important role in policy disputes at die committee level? Recent work on congressional policymaking has argued persuasively diat die committee process of hearings, deliberations, and markup is a partisan process in which committees respond to cues from each party's leadership and caucus. 27 Of course, committees in odier legislatures around die world are also likely to be dominated by the majority party (or parties). However, descriptions of the policymaking process in multiparty systems emphasize die consensual dynamics of diis process. Indeed, behind-die-scenes policymaking in European democracies may be, on die whole, less partisan dian in die United States.
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None of these patterns is reflected in votes on final passage. The salient characteristic of cross-party compromise in European democracies is die way diat such compromises are shielded from public view. Committee deliberations are generally held behind closed doors, and official divisions (widiin 412 DOES PARTY IDEOLOGY MATTER? the committee) are rare. A revealing episode in Swedish party politics is related by a former Conservative party chairman, who recalls a conversation he had in 1984, while leading die opposition, with die Minister of Finance: "When I said that there are some things which we agree on, he [the Minister] said diat 'we agree on quite a lot, but we are not allowed to show diat.'"
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In most parliamentary systems, dissension within party caucuses is handled discreedy; compromises are reached so as to maintain party unity on the final vote. Squabbling is done in private, and calm serenity obtains in public. These systems are able to accommodate a great deal of cross-party compromising without bringing the notion of "standing for something" into question, for parties will show up on different sides of the aisle to shout at each other-or at least to vote against each other-in Parliament. In the final tally, members of a party stand shoulder to shoulder.
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In the American Congress, by contrast, the sausage-production machine is in full view. Compromise, where it occurs, occurs in front of the public, for committee hearings are open and well attended by interestgroup representatives and the media, and roll-call votes are common. Durr, Gilmour, and Wolbrecht note: "As proposals are shaped in Congress, every disagreement is magnified and broadcast, so that when the bargaining and amending are done, the finished product appears not as a coherent whole but as a patchwork of compromises." 31 In short, die operation of the American legislature-both on and off the floor-accentuates the disarray of the legislative parties.
Third, weak party cohesion within the U.S. Congress does not necessarily countermand the influence of party ideology in determining vote outcomes. It is to be remembered that on many divisions-particularly those of great policy significance-House and Senate party leaders have votes "in reserve." This means that a number of members of the winning side will have communicated to their leaders that if their vote is absolutely needed to ensure victory, it can be counted on. Such a tactic allows leaders a way to win floor divisions without compromising the reelection prospects of their members (whose constituents, let us say, disapprove of the party line). 32 In short, congressional leaders with few carrots and sticks at their disposal (relative to their counterparts in parliamentary democracies) still find ways-devious ways, to be sure-to achieve party governance.
Fourth, the fragmented leadership of the two houses of Congressand particularly of the Senate-may have no net effect on each party's ideological center of gravity if those on the left of a party's caucus are balanced by diose on die right. For every Olympia Snowe, one generally 4 1 3 finds a Jesse Helms. In odier words, a more centralized system of party nominations-as obtains, for example, in Britain-might yield a more homogeneous set of legislators on either side of the aisle; it would not necessarily yield a differently situated aggregate. Indeed, a median-legislator theory of policymaking widiin each party's caucus yields identical results in strongleadership and weak-leadership regimes.
This brings us to a fundamental fact about two-party systems. Each side is likely to remain relatively stable, despite shifts of adherents (voters or legislators) from side to side, because of the fact that dissidents have only one route of exit-the other side. Most adherents, in other words, are effectively captives of die party diey inhabit. Only those near the center of the ideological spectrum can contemplate apostasy. But a movement of centrists from one side to the other is unlikely to change die basic ideological configuration of the party system; diough die spectrum may move slightly to die left or right, die distance separating die parties is likely to remain constant, and each party's core values remain intact.
In a multiparty system, by contrast, all but the most extreme partisans will find several routes of escape. These routes are more ideologically acceptable, since the neighboring parties within a multiparty system occupy positions that are relatively close together (the "crowding" phenomenon). In Germany, for example, the trip from the liberal camp (the FDP) to the social-democratic camp (SPD) is not nearly so far as the trip from Democracy to Republicanism in the United States. Under this set of circumstances, party leadership, party organization, and voting cohesion within the legislature are absolutely essential to preserving a sense of identity among the participants. In other words, voting cohesion matters in a multiparty system in ways that it does not within two-party systems, for the simple reason that in two-party systems defectors are more easily tolerated. A war fought on a single front requires a lower threshold of organization than a war with multiple fronts. Two-partyism has yet another, more obvious effect on the viability of party ideology in the legislative process. With one of the purest two-party monopolies of any democracy in the world, 34 die party platform in die United States operates as a "contract" or "mandate" to an extent unimaginable within multiparty systems. Where coalition government is the rule, a party's platform is necessarily compromised on the way to becoming public law. Indeed, such compromises may reach across the government/opposition divide, fragmenting policymaking power and further weakening the connection between promise and performance. Multiple coalition partners, argues George Tsebelis, mean that each partner has an effective veto over changes in policy, leading to a situation in 414 DOES PARTY IDEOLOGY MATTER? which the most likely policy outcome is a reiteration, or slight alteration, of the status quo. 35 Empirical work by Huber and Powell show that policymakers in two-party systems are more likely to deviate from median-voter demands than are policymakers within multiparty systems, indicating once again that partisanship matters quite a lot in the American case. 36 This line of argument becomes stronger still if one considers the factors impinging upon policymakers from outside the political system. Although the matter is difficult to operationalize, it is generally recognized that the degree of policymaking sovereignty enjoyed by a nation-statethe ability to conduct its own affairs on its own terms-will affect the ability of policymakers to deliver on their campaign promises.
37 Small countries with a high degree of trade dependence, especially if hampered by transnational confederations (such as the European Union), are much less able to set the terms of their fiscal, monetary, and security policies.
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Policymaking in a small state is a largely reactive affair, and this reactiveness means that party ideology is likely to be sacrificed to the practical realities imposed by world markets and world politics. A megastate like the United States, with the world's largest economy, regional hegemony through most of its history, and few "entangling alliances" that it cannot control, is not as susceptible to external pressures.
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As a general formulation, then, the strength of party ideology in the policymaking process must be considered as the product of both international and domestic factors. The former concern the degree of autonomy a country enjoys vis-a-vis world-system pressures. The latter concern the extent to which a given polity exemplifies the paradigm of party government (a.k.a. majoritarian democracy). The central issue here is centralization of power, and the most important institutional features of centralization, I submit, are (1) the number of effective parties in the party system, (2) the internal cohesiveness (organizational strength) of those parties, and (3) the unity or disunity of the legislative and executive branches of government.
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If this formulation is, in the main, an accurate appraisal of the factors leading to a strong party ideology-public policy connection, it may be concluded that the United States occupies an intermediate position on this hypothetical scale. The weakness of party organization and the fragmentation of government are mitigated by the small number of parties, their surreptitious control of policymaking channels, and the high degree of sovereignty enjoyed by the American state. It seems safe to assume, along these lines, that party ideology would matter even more un- der circumstances imposed by a Westminster system of government. 41 Even so, as the foregoing arguments-and the evidence of this studymake clear, the goal of party government is much closer to a reality than people generally suppose.
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